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ABSTRACT
The Constitution of Mauritius, unlike those of South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Kenya, does not guide courts on the issue of the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through human rights. Jurisprudence from Mauritius shows 
courts have grappled with the issue of establishing the criteria that have 
to be followed in determining whether or not to admit evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. Courts have limited their jurisprudence to 
a few rights: the right to freedom from torture; the right to remain silent; the 
right against self-incrimination; and the right to counsel. The jurisprudence 
is inconsistent on the issue of whether or not evidence obtained through 
human rights violations should be automatically excluded. In some cases 
courts have held that such evidence is automatically inadmissible whereas 
in others courts have held that such evidence may be admissible. It is 
recommended that the best approach would be to only exclude such evidence 
if its admission would render the trial unfair or would be detrimental to the 
administration of justice.
1 Introduction
The Constitution of Mauritius,1 (the Constitution), provides for various 
human rights2 which include the rights of arrested and detained persons. 
The Constitution is silent on the issue of the relationship between 
the right to a fair trial3 and the admissibility of evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. However, the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts, that is, the intermediary court and the district court, 
have grappled with the issue of whether or not to admit evidence 
obtained through human rights violations. Practice from Mauritius has 
been consistent on the fact that evidence obtained through torture 
* LLB (Makerere) LLM (UP) LLM (UFS) LLD (UWC), Professor, Faculty of Law, 
University of the Western Cape. 
1 Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius 1968 (hereinafter ‘the Constitution’).
2 See Chapter II of the Constitution, Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
of the Individual.
3 The Supreme Court has referred to the right to a fair hearing as ‘sacrosanct’. See 
Sabapathee v State (1997) SCJ 337 at 20.
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is inadmissible.4 However, the same cannot be said with regards to 
evidence obtained through the violation of other rights especially the 
arrested person’s right to counsel and the right to remain silent. In the 
light of the fact that the Constitution does not guide courts on how 
to deal with evidence obtained through human rights violations, the 
Supreme Court has had to change its positions on whether such evidence 
has to be automatically inadmissible or whether there could be cases 
where it may be admitted. The purpose of this article is to highlight 
that jurisprudence and argue that the Supreme Court’s recent position 
to the effect that evidence obtained through human rights violations 
has to be excluded, irrespective of the minor nature of the violation, 
is too rigid and not in line with the modern trend in other African 
countries such as South Africa,5 Kenya,6 Zimbabwe,7 and Namibia.8 
It is also not in line with the approaches taken in jurisdictions outside 
of Africa such as Hong Kong9 and could lead to some members of the 
public, especially victims of crime, to lose confidence in the criminal 
justice system in cases where the accused are acquitted simply because 
the police violated their rights. As the Mauritian district court held in 
Police v Khodabaccus Ahmad Nooradeen,10 ‘[t]he ultimate duty of the 
court is to restore public confidence in the criminal justice system’.11 
It is recommended, inter alia, that there is a need for the Supreme Court 
to devise a flexible approach when dealing with evidence obtained 
through human rights violations. This evidence should only be held 
4 See R v Mensa (1989) MR 140, (1989) SCJ 243 (where the Court held that evidence 
obtained through oppression, which includes cruel treatment, is inadmissible). 
Under clause 43(6)(a) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill (No IV of 2013), 
‘oppression’ is defined to include ‘torture, inhuman or degrading treatment’.
5 Section 35(5) of the South African Constitution provides that ‘[e]vidence obtained 
in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the 
admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental 
to the administration of justice’. 
6 Article 50(4) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) provides that ‘[e]vidence obtained 
in a manner that violates any right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights 
shall be excluded if the admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair, or 
would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice’.
7 Article 70(3) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013) provides that ‘[i]n any criminal 
trial, evidence that has been obtained in a manner that violates any provision of the 
Chapter must be excluded if the admission of the evidence would render the trial 
unfair or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice or the 
public interest’.
8 JD Mujuzi ‘The admissibility in Namibia of evidence obtained through human rights 
violations’ (2016) 16 Afr Hum Rights L J 407-434.
9 See for example, HKSAR v Mohammad Riaz Khan (2012)15 HKCFAR 232 at para 
[22]; HKSAR v. Yu Lik Wai William [2015] HKDC 719; DCCC 325/2014 (30 June 2015) 
at para 171.
10 Police v Khodabaccus Ahmad Nooradeen (2007) MBG 215 at 6.
11 Ibid p.6. See also Police v Peerbux Mohammad Hossman (2007) MBG 219 at 8.
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inadmissible if its admission would render the accused’s trial unfair or 
would be detrimental to the administration of justice. The author will 
start by highlighting the relevant rights that courts have dealt with 
when grappling with the admissibility of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations before discussing the case law illustrating how 
courts have dealt with that evidence. 
2 The rights of arrested and detained persons
Jurisprudence from Mauritian courts shows that three rights have been 
dealt with by courts on the question of the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through human rights violations: the right to freedom from 
torture; the right to silence; and the right to consult with counsel. 
Of the three rights, only the right to freedom from torture is provided 
for in the Constitution.12 The other two rights have been read into 
the Constitution and therefore their detailed discussion is necessary. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail how Mauritian 
courts have dealt with evidence obtained through torture.
Article 5 of the Constitution provides for the right to personal liberty 
and it stipulates the rights of arrested and detained persons. For the 
purposes of this article, the most important clauses are 2 and 3 which 
are to the effect that:
‘(2) Any person who is arrested or detained shall be informed as soon as is 
reasonably practicable, in a language that he understands, of the reasons for 
his arrest or detention.
(3) Any person who is arrested or detained – (a) for the purpose of bringing 
him before a court in execution of the order of a court; (b) upon reasonable 
suspicion of his having committed, or being about to commit a criminal 
offence; or (c) upon reasonable suspicion of his being likely to commit 
breaches of the peace, and who is not released, shall be afforded reasonable 
facilities to consult a legal representative of his own choice and shall be 
brought without undue delay before a court; and if any person arrested or 
detained as mentioned in paragraph (b) is not tried within a reasonable 
time, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be brought 
against him, he shall be released either unconditionally or upon reasonable 
conditions, including, in particular, such conditions as are reasonably 
necessary to ensure that he appears at a later date for trial or for proceedings 
preliminary to trial; and if any person arrested or detained as mentioned in 
paragraph (c) is not brought before a court within reasonable time in order 
that the court may decide whether to order him to give security for his good 
behaviour, then, without prejudice to any further proceedings that may be 
brought against him, he shall be released unconditionally.’ 
12 Article 7(1) of the Constitution provides that ‘[n]o person shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment or other such treatment’.
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Although art 5 provides for several rights of arrested and detained 
persons, jurisprudence from Mauritian courts shows that only two 
rights have been emphasised when it comes to the issue of dealing 
with evidence obtained through human rights violations: the right 
to silence and the right to consult with a legal representative at the 
time of arrest. As mentioned above, this has been the case although 
these rights are not expressly provided for under the Constitution. It is 
therefore important to discuss how courts have developed these rights 
before illustrating how courts have approached the issue of admitting 
evidence obtained through a violation of these rights.
2.1 The right to silence
Unlike in the constitutions of other African countries,13 an arrested 
person’s right to silence is not provided for under the Mauritian 
constitution.14 Mauritian courts have held that this right derives from 
Rule II of the Judges’ Rules15 and from the accused’s right against 
self-incrimination. Rule II provides that:
‘As soon as a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has 
committed an offence, that person shall be cautioned before putting any 
questions or any further question relating to that offence. “You are not 
obliged to say anything unless you wish to do so but what you say may be 
put into writing and given in evidence.” When after being cautioned a person 
is being questioned, or elects to make a statement, a record shall be kept of 
the time and place at which any such questioning or statement began and 
ended and of the persons present.’
Rule II has to be read together with Rule III which regulates the 
caution that has to be administered when a person has been charged. 
The Mauritian Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent on 
the issue of whether or not police officers are required to follow the 
13 See for example, art 63(f) of the Constitution of Angola (2010); art 19(2) of the 
Constitution of Ethiopia (1994); art 49(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution of Kenya (2010); 
art 42(2)(a) of the Constitution of Malawi (1994); art 23 of the Constitution of 
Morocco (2011); art 35(2) of the Constitution of Nigeria (1999); art 18(3) of the 
Constitution of Seychelles (1993); s 35(1)(a) of the Constitution of South Africa 
(1996); and art 50(4)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (2013).
14 For a detailed discussion of the meaning of the right to silence see Police v Dwarka 
Hans Yatindranath (2007) INT 210.
15 In The State v Bundhun (2006) SCJ 254 at 9-10, the Supreme Court observed that 
‘The Judges Rules in their present form were…made by the Judges in England for 
the guidance of police officers conducting investigations. They were formulated by 
a Committee of Judges and approved by a meeting of all the Queen’s Bench Judges. 
They were made applicable to Mauritius in March 1965, as indicated in a letter dated 
12 March 1965 written by Tom Vickers, Chief Secretary, on behalf of the Governor 
of Mauritius, and addressed to the Commissioner of Police.’
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Judges’ Rules strictly. For example, in Martin v R,16 the Court held that 
for a statement obtained by the police from an arrested person to be 
admissible, the ‘Judges Rules…must be scrupulously respected’ by the 
police.17 However, in the majority of the cases, the Supreme Court has 
held that failure by the police to follow the Judges’ Rules to obtain 
a statement from an arrested person does not render the statement 
automatically inadmissible.18 This is so because the Judges’ Rules have 
no force of law but they are ‘administrative directions for the guidance 
of the police authorities’.19 In other words, ‘[i]n general the Judges’ 
Rules are not rules of law but are rules of practice to guide police 
officers in conducting their investigations’.20 The latter approach has 
been followed in some African countries such as Kenya,21 Seychelles,22 
and Nigeria23 where courts have also held that failure to follow the 
Judges’ Rules does not render the accused’s statement automatically 
inadmissible. The Judges’ Rules also serve a limited purpose. As the 
Supreme Court held in Carpen M v The State,24 ‘the Judges’ Rules 
are guidelines for enquiring officers to prevent an abuse of authority 
on their part and to ensure that confessions are made voluntarily.’25 
However, evidence obtained in violation of the Judges Rules is 
inadmissible if its admission would be prejudicial to the accused.26
In the light of the fact that the Constitution does not provide for 
the arrested person’s right to remain silent, in The Queen v M. Boyjoo 
and R.D. Boyjoo27 the Supreme Court referred to art 10(7) of the 
Constitution which is to the effect that ‘[n]o person who is tried for a 
16 Martin v R (1991) MR 102; (1991) SCJ 221.
17 Ibid 6.
18 See for example, Zariwala R H v State (1999) SCJ 36 (the Court held failure by the 
accused to a sign a statement made to the police does not render it inadmissible); 
Carpen M v The State (2010) SCJ 105 at 3.
19 The Queen v M. Boyjoo and R.D. Boyjoo (1991) MR 284, (1991) SCJ 379 at 4.
20 The State v E. Madelon (2004) SCJ 129, p.4. See also Police v Mallet Laval Emmanuel 
(2006) INT 120.
21 Jane Betty Mwaiseje & 2 others v Republic [1992) eKLR 8.
22 R v Lesperance (Ruling 2) (CO 51/2013) [2017] SCSC 33 (23 January 2017) at para 8.
23 The Nigerian Supreme Court held in Iregu Ejima Hassan v The State (2016) LPELR-
42554(SC) at paras 17-18, that ‘[t]he Judges Rules are rules made by English Judges 
to guide English Police Officers. The Rules are not Rules of law but Rules of 
administrative practice. They are rules made for the more efficient and effective 
administration of justice and therefore should never be used to defeat justice’. 
See also Oghenevweren Stanley Ogisugo v The State (2015) LPELR-24544(CA); John v 
State (2015) LPELR-40424(CA); Samuel Ojegele v The State (1988) NWLR (Pt.71) 414.
24 Carpen M v The State (2010) SCJ 105.
25 Ibid 3.
26 Police v Rosse (2015) INT 368.
27 Boyjoo supra (n19).
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criminal offence shall be compelled to give evidence at the trial’ and 
held that:
‘This constitutional principle against self-incrimination is not limited to cases 
where the accused is charged before a court of law. At the stage of the police 
enquiry, when he has been charged and before he is questioned, the accused 
must be told of his right of silence, leaving it to him to make the choice 
whether he wishes to waive the privilege or not.’28
The Court pointed out that this right has been recognised by courts 
in other countries such as the United States of America.29 The court 
added that:
‘The rule against self-incrimination would be ineffective if this fact is not 
brought home to the accused. And bringing that fact to the accused enables 
him to make a choice about making a statement or not. This would be 
highly relevant for the purposes of the voluntariness test. Indeed failure to 
administer the caution may well be construed as a breach of the voluntariness 
test and will therefore offend against the principle of self-incrimination. This 
would result in the virtual exclusion of a confession on the ground that a 
constitutional provision would have been breached in the sense that the 
rule against self-incrimination and the accompanying right to be cautioned 
are part and parcel of the fair trial requirement which is guaranteed to an 
accused under the Constitution.’30
Likewise, in Joymungul A K v The State,31 the Supreme Court held that:
‘[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is a deeply-rooted common law 
principle. There is no doubt that the right to remain silent and the right 
not to be compelled to incriminate oneself extend both to the investigation 
process and trial proceedings. The classic formulation of this privilege is that 
no one is bound to answer any question if the answer would have a tendency 
to expose him to any criminal charge…’32
In The State v Bundhun33 the Supreme Court distinguished between 
the accused’s right to remain silent at his trial which is provided for 
under art 10(7) of the Constitution and the suspect’s right to remain 
silent at the time of arrest.34 The court held that a court may draw a 
reasonable inference against an accused if he chooses to exercise his 




31 Joymungul A K v The State (2014) SCJ 143.
32 Ibid 8.
33 Bundhun supra (n15).
34 Ibid 10.
35 Ibid 11.
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‘The right to silence of a suspect at enquiry stage is really an extension of 
the right to silence enjoyed by an accused party. Under an old Common 
Law rule in England no adverse inference could be drawn against a suspect 
when he had, after caution, exercised his right to silence, but this rule is not 
part of our law…and indeed has been derogated from in England itself… 
In my view the right to silence, which is a natural corollary of the rule that 
the prosecution bears the burden of proof in a criminal trial, does not carry 
with it at investigation stage a subsidiary right to be completely spared from 
questioning once the decision to exercise that right has been communicated 
to the police. A reasonable number of questions may still be put to the 
suspect, and his response – be it mere silence – noted. However, care must 
be taken by the police, once a suspect has indicated an intention to exercise 
his right to silence, not to indulge in an oppressive form of questioning – as 
opposed to simply putting questions and recording the response – as the 
suspect’s right to silence would then be infringed.’36
However, the fact that an accused person has exercised his right to 
remain silent is not ‘an acknowledgement of the truth of the accusation’ 
against him.37 The importance of interpreting the right to a fair trial 
to include what transpires at the investigative stage was emphasised 
by the Supreme Court in Jugnauth P K v The Secretary to the Cabinet 
and Head of the Civil Service Affairs38 when the Court held that ‘[t]he 
safeguard of a fair trial in fact includes and encompasses the methods 
of investigation by the prosecuting authorities’.39 If the accused alleges 
before court that at the time of his arrest the police did not inform 
him of his right to silence, the police must convince the court of the 
manner in which the accused was informed of his right otherwise the 
accused’s statement to the police will be inadmissible.40 
An arrested person may waive his right to remain silent but before 
the waiver can be valid, the court has to be convinced that ‘[h]e 
expressed in unequivocal terms that he had fully understood his right 
to remain silent and not to say anything if he so wished and that 
whatever he may say would be put into writing and may be used 
as evidence against him.’41 In practice, the police warn the accused 
that he has a right to remain silent and that if he chooses to speak, 
whatever he says will be written down and can be used in evidence 
36 Ibid 11.
37 Carpenen G. N. v The State & Reine De Carthage G. v The State (2014) SCJ 382, p.9. 
See also Police v Arena Gregorio Marco (2014) INT 90 for the discussion of the right 
to remain silent at the trial.
38 Jugnauth P K v The Secretary to the Cabinet and Head of the Civil Service Affairs 
(2013) SCJ 132.
39 Ibid 12.
40 Police v Mohamad Yusuf Sheik Issah Ramjaun (2016) PMP 231.
41 Joymungul supra (n31) 9.
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against him.42 In ICAC v Balraj Appanah43 the court held that: ‘this 
caution is also not given in void but as a result of the suspect’s right 
to silence and right against self-incrimination, hence the words used 
in the caution…conveying to him in clear terms that he has a right not 
to self-incriminate himself and a right to silence’.44 Failure to inform 
the arrested person that whatever he says may be used against him is 
in breach of the Judges’ Rules although that in itself does not mean 
that the statement is automatically inadmissible.45 An arrested person 
may waive his right to silence even if he is intoxicated as long as 
he fully appreciates the content of the right and the consequences 
of waiving it.46 The accused may waive his rights to silence or to 
consult with counsel before making a statement to the police. In the 
event of waiving his rights, evidence obtained from him will not be 
admissible if ‘the accused waived her constitutional right against self-
incrimination not willingly but through by unfair means used by the 
police’.47 Questioning the accused after warning him of his right to 
remain silent does not necessarily amount to a violation of that right 
unless the questioning was oppressive.48
2.2 The right to consult with counsel 
Article 5(3)(c) of the Constitution provides that an arrested or detained 
person ‘shall be afforded reasonable facilities to consult a legal 
representative of his own choice.’ The Judges’ Rules provide that: 
‘[E]very person at any stage of an investigation should be able to communicate 
and to consult privately with a legal adviser. This is so even if he is in 
custody, provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or hindrance is 
caused to the processes of investigation or the administration of justice by 
his doing so’.49
Paragraph 7 of Appendix B to the Judges’ Rules is to the effect that:
‘(a)  A person in police custody should be allowed to speak on the telephone 
to his legal adviser or to his nearest relative provided that no hindrance 
is reasonably likely to be caused to the processes of investigation, or 
the administration of justice by his doing so. He should be supplied on 
request with writing materials and his letters should be sent by post or 
42 Police v Vencatasamy K. R (2008) LPW 56 at 2.
43 ICAC v Balraj Appanah (2017) INT 306.
44 Ibid 3.
45 Rosse supra (n26).
46 Police v Auliar (2015) INT 352.
47 Ibid 8.
48 Police v Mamode Paul Robert (2010) BMB 24. For a detailed discussion of what 
amounts to oppressive questioning, see R v Mensa supra (n4).
49 See para 3(c) of the introductory notes to the Rules.
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otherwise with the least possible delay. Additionally, telegrams should 
be sent at once, at his own expenses.
(b)  Persons in police custody should not only be informed orally of the 
rights and facilities available to them, but in addition notices describing 
them should be displayed at convenient and conspicuous places at 
police stations and the attention of persons in police custody should be 
drawn to these notices.’
Whether or not an arrested or detained person has a right to consult 
a legal representative of his choice is an issue which has been hotly 
contested in the jurisprudence of the Mauritian Supreme Court. In 
The Queen v M. Boyjoo and R.D. Boyjoo50 the Supreme Court referred 
to jurisprudence from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to 
art 5(2)(c) of the Constitution and to the Judges’ Rules to hold that:
‘[T]he adoption of the 1964 Judges Rules in Mauritius has become part of 
the rights of an accused person which are protected by sections 3 and 5 of 
our Constitution. This would mean that the rule requiring the accused to 
be informed of his right to counsel is protected by our Constitution. It is 
therefore the duty of the police to inform an accused person of this right and 
not only to assume that the person is or should be aware of that right. The 
police should also make sure that the person has understood that right. Such 
an information must be passed on to the accused as early as possible to the 
person in detention’.51
For the first time in Mauritian legal history and despite the fact that 
the Constitution is silent on these issues, the Supreme Court held that 
an arrested or detained person has a right to counsel and that the 
police have a duty to inform him of this right. Failure by the police to 
inform him of this right amounts to its violation. Apart from informing 
him of his right to counsel, the police have a duty to ensure that the 
person has understood this right. It is against this background that the 
court added that ‘the mere exhibition of notices in police stations with 
regard to the right to counsel is insufficient in itself to make clear to 
the detained person of his right to retain a lawyer.’52 The requirement 
established in this case has been referred to as ‘stringent.’53 However, 
in Samserally v State54 the court (three-judge panel) changed its 
position on whether a police officer has a duty to inform an arrested or 
detained person of his right to counsel. It referred to its reasoning in 
The Queen v M. Boyjoo and R.D. Boyjoo, to art 5(2) of the Constitution, 
to the Judges’ Rules and to the American Supreme Court decision of 
Miranda and held that:
50 Boyjoo supra (n19).
51 Ibid 5.
52 Ibid 5.
53 Police v Seenarain (2006) INT 181 at 4.
54 Samserally v State (1993) MR 94, (1993) SCJ 219.
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‘Section 5(3) of the Constitution does not impose a duty on the police 
authority to inform a suspect that he has a right to counsel. It merely covers 
situations where a suspect expresses the wish to consult a legal adviser of 
his choice whereupon he must, by law, be afforded reasonable facilities to 
do so. Should the intention of the legislator be construed differently, it would 
follow that a. suspect who falls within the financial prescriptions qualify him 
to be legally represented at public expense when he is charged with criminal 
offence under section 10(2)(d) of the Constitution should, on the principle 
of equality before the law, have the right to be legally assisted as from the 
enquiry stage.’55
In the same year, in the case of State v Pandiyan,56 the Supreme 
Court (the same judge who decided The Queen v M. Boyjoo and R.D. 
Boyjoo), referred to the jurisprudence from the Privy Council, from the 
Court of Appeal of New Zealand, and from the United Kingdom and 
to academic publications, but without referring to its decision in The 
Queen v M. Boyjoo and R.D. Boyjoo, held that:
‘There would be, therefore, a duty on the part of the police to inform a person 
under arrest or in detention that he has a right to consult a legal adviser. To 
hold otherwise would be tantamount to putting a retrograde interpretation 
on the provisions of our Constitution relating to the fundamental rights of 
the individual.’57
The same judge came to a similar conclusion two years later in the case 
of The State v Bibi Fatemah Dilmamode58 and observed that although 
Samserally v State had been decided by three judges and in principle 
was ‘bound by it’, he decided, ‘with due respect to the judges who 
decided Samserally’, to ‘depart or even ignore Samserally’ because he 
felt ‘bound by the decisions of the Judicial Committee referred to in 
Pandiyan, as the Law Lords were interpreting provisions of the law 
similar to ours in these cases.’59 It is against that background that 
the court concluded that ‘in Mauritius, there is a duty on the police 
to inform a suspect of his right to counsel, unless, this would hinder 
the conduct of the enquiry, in which case, the police should prove 
conclusively that this may be so’.60 There are at least two issues to note 
about the court’s decision in The State v Bibi Fatemah Dilmamode. 
First, apart from reaffirming the decision in Pandiyan, the court also 
adds an exception to the right to consult with counsel. This means that 
this right is not absolute. However, the exception has to be justified 
55 Ibid 4-5.
56 State v Pandiyan (1993) MR 169, (1993) SCJ 317.
57 Ibid 7.
58 The State v Bibi Fatemah Dilmamode (1995) SCJ 416, (1995) MR 186.
59 Ibid 13.
60 Ibid 14.
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by the police. Secondly, the court did not overrule Samserally. It just 
ignored it. 
Two years later, in State v Coowar,61 the Supreme Court, in a three-
judge panel, had to determine, ‘in view of the conflicting Mauritian 
case-law’ the issue of whether ‘the Police [are] under a legal obligation 
under ss 3 and 5(3)(b) of the Constitution, coupled with the Judges’ 
Rules 1965, to inform an accused party who is in police custody of 
his right to Counsel?’.62 The court referred to the jurisprudence from 
the Privy Council and from the United Kingdom and to its conflicting 
decisions and held that ‘the Police is…under a legal obligation to 
inform a person in police custody of his right to communicate with 
Counsel’.63 Equally important, the court also held that Samserally was 
‘wrongly decided’.64 This decision brought the debate of whether or 
not the police have a duty to inform an arrested person of the right 
to counsel to an end. Although this right is not expressly provided for 
in the Constitution, the Supreme Court held in Roberts Peter Wayne v 
The State of Mauritius65 the suspect’s right to legal representation has, 
through case law, ‘been elevated to a constitutional one’.66
Since the 1997 decision in State v Coowar, courts, both the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts have developed jurisprudence to expound 
on the content of the arrested or detained person’s right to counsel. This 
jurisprudence shows the following issues: the police have to inform the 
arrested or detained person of the right to counsel as early as possible 
so as to protect his rights to silence and against self-incrimination;67 
a suspect may waive his right to counsel but for ‘any waiver in order 
to be valid and effective must be one made by the suspect after having 
given full thought to the consequence of giving up such a right’;68 
a suspect does not have ‘a constitutional right to legal representation 
at public expense at the enquiry stage’69 and ‘that there being no 
constitutional right to legal aid at enquiry stage, there is no such right 
of the accused to be so informed’.70 As the Supreme Court put it in 
State v Moazzam Ali Shaikh,71 the Constitution is ‘clear that the right 




65 Roberts Peter Wayne v The State of Mauritius (2015) SCJ 290.
66 Ibid 4.
67 State v Coowar Mamode Aniff (1998) SCJ 64, (1998) MR 10.
68 Coowar Mamode Aniff supra (n67) p.10. See also Police v Golamhossein Ramzan 
Elama (2018) INT 3; Rajubally M.R. v The State (2016) SCJ 197, in which the suspect 
waived his right to counsel.
69 State v Mamitiana Thomson Rasamoelina (1998) SCJ 265 at 6.
70 Mamitiana Thomson Rasamoelina supra (n69) 7.
71 State v Moazzam Ali Shaikh (1998) SCJ 80.
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to counsel was limited to one of the suspect’s own choice which could 
only be effected through his own expenses and not at public expense 
where a counsel is imposed upon him’.72 However, there have been 
cases where the police have informed arrested persons of their right 
to legal aid before taking statements from them.73 
The police have made facilities, such as free telephone call services, 
available to an arrested person to call his lawyer;74 the police have 
no obligation to ask the accused ‘if he wants to contact a relative 
with a view to retain the services of counsel’;75 an arrested person’s 
lawyer is permitted to be present when he is being interrogated by the 
police76 or other law enforcement agencies77 although the ‘fact that 
the statements were recorded in the absence of counsel is not itself a 
breach of the Judges’ Rules and the Constitution’;78 the obligation to 
inform a person of his right to counsel only arises when he is arrested 
or under police custody79 although in practice the police inform such 
persons of their right to counsel.80 If a person is educated and aware 
of his right to counsel, the police do not have a duty to inform him 
of that right and the evidence obtained from him will be admissible 
especially if the court is ‘extremely doubtful whether counsel’s advice 
would have added anything to the accused’s knowledge of his rights’81 
or where ‘he is perfectly aware of his right to contact counsel’.82 The 
arrested or detained person has to be informed of his right to counsel 
in a language that he understands.83 It is now imperative to highlight 
the jurisprudence from Mauritian courts dealing with the admissibility 
of evidence obtained through a violation of the right to counsel and 
the right to silence.
72 Ibid 4.
73 Police v Jeetoo Sanjayduth (2016) MBG 94 at 2.
74 Police v Francis Gerald Michel (2006) INT 206; Police v Sooklall M T (2008) INT 266. 
75 Police v L Boodhoo (2015) INT 93 at 5.
76 Police v Dwarka Hans Yatindranath (2007) INT 210; Police v Bageenath Gino 
Guillano Clovis – Ruling (2014) LPW 159; Police v Sundanum Richard Ansley (2013) 
LPW 87.
77 Police v Joymungul Ambar Kumar (2010) INT 12.
78 Boodhoo supra (n75) 5.
79 Police v Poonappa Naiken Veenesham (2007) LPW 124.
80 Police v Vencatasamy K. R. (2008) LPW 256.
81 Police v Ramsamy Devadrassen (2007) LPW 473 at 11. See also Police v Raphael 
(2015) ROD 113 at para 24.
82 Police v Lam Yee Man Lam Chai Kee (2008) LPW 396 at 5.
83 Police v Auliar supra (n46) (the accused was informed of his rights in the Creole 
language); Police v Mamun Ranna (2015) PL3 55 (the accused, a foreign national, 
was informed of his rights in his mother tongue); Police v Madhoo Kunal (2011) PL3 
9 (the accused made his statement to the police in the Creole language).
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3  The admissibility of evidence obtained through human 
rights violations
With the exception of the right to freedom from torture where courts 
have held that evidence obtained through torture is inadmissible, the 
position on the admissibility of evidence obtained through human 
rights violations, in particular the violations of the rights to silence 
and to consult with counsel, remains unclear in Mauritius. The 
discussion below illustrates that Mauritian courts have taken two 
irreconcilable approaches on this issue: in some decisions, courts have 
held that evidence obtained through human rights violations must be 
excluded whereas in others, courts have held that, depending on the 
circumstances of the case, evidence obtained through human rights 
violations may be admitted. Cases on both positions will be illustrated 
below. 
As mentioned above, the right of an arrested person to remain silent 
is not expressly provided for in the Mauritian constitution. The Supreme 
Court has referred to the accused’s right not to be compelled to testify 
at his trial and the Judges’ Rules that read the right of an arrested 
person to remain silent into the constitution. It has been mentioned 
above that the Supreme Court held that failure by the police to adhere 
to the Judges’ Rules does not render a statement obtained from an 
arrested person automatically inadmissible. Elevating the arrested 
person’s right to remain silent to a constitutional right means that the 
admissibility of evidence obtained through a violation of this right 
ceases to be governed by the Judges’ Rules. It is now governed by the 
Constitution. It is against that background that the Supreme Court held 
in The Queen v M. Boyjoo and R.D. Boyjoo84 that
‘Violations of fundamental rights under the Constitution should not be 
looked upon with levity…To that extent the English approach to breaches 
of the Judges’ Rules [that ‘these rules have not the force of law; they are 
administrative directions and observance of which police authorities should 
enforce upon their subordinates as tending to the fair administration of 
justice’] may not now be applicable to Mauritius in so far as the right of 
silence and the giving of the caution as well as access to a legal adviser are 
concerned.’85
In State v Coowar Mamode Aniff 86 the Supreme Court, for the first 
time, dealt directly with the issue of whether there are circumstances 
in which evidence obtained through human rights violations may be 
admitted. The police had not informed the accused of his right to 
counsel at the time of arrest. The court held that a breach of the 
84 Boyjoo supra (n19).
85 Ibid 3.
86 Coowar Mamode Aniff supra (n61).
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Judges’ Rules should be distinguished from a breach of a fundamental 
right. Evidence obtained through a violation of the Judges’ Rules 
may be admissible but that the same approach ‘cannot be applied’ 
when dealing with ‘a breach of a fundamental right protected by the 
Constitution’.87 The court referred to its earlier case law and added 
that:
‘[T]he Constitution must be observed as absolute command…and that 
“violation of fundamental rights under the Constitution should not be looked 
upon with levity…, it is clear that when dealing with fundamental rights, 
the provisions of the Constitution should not be treated lightly and that 
violation of those provisions should be sanctioned severely otherwise the 
provisions of the Constitution would cease to have any meaningful content 
whatsoever’.88
The court referred to jurisprudence from Canadian courts to the 
effect that evidence obtained through human rights violations may 
be admitted unless its admission would ‘bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute’, to hold that Canadian courts were justified to use 
such a test in dealing with such evidence because they are expressly 
permitted to do so by s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. The court added that ‘[s]uch provision is unfortunately not 
found in our Constitution and…one should not read more into the 
Constitution than as provided or else one would be taxed of doing 
judicial activism.’89 The court concluded that:
‘[I]n the light of the authorities above and in the absence in our Constitution 
of a provision giving the court the discretion to admit evidence obtained 
in breach of a fundamental right, evidence so obtained would per se be 
inadmissible and I do not have any discretion in the matter’.90
The court came to a similar conclusion in Geneviève Alain Steeve v The 
State91 in which the accused’s right to counsel had been violated by the 
police. However, in State v E. Madelon92 the Supreme Court appears to 
have changed its position on this issue. In this case the police, contrary 
to the Judges’ Rules, had not sufficiently informed the accused of the 
offence against him before they questioned him. The court found that 
‘[i]n general the Judges Rules are not rules of law but are rules of 
practice to guide police officers in conducting their investigations’.93 
After discussing the different views on whether an arrested person 
87 Ibid 4.
88 Ibid 8.
89 Ibid 12. 
90 Ibid 12.
91 Geneviève Alain Steeve supra (n91).
92 Madelon supra (n92).
93 Ibid 4.
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had a constitutional right to be informed of the offence against him 
before he is questioned by the police, the Court held that:
‘It must be borne in mind that not every breach of a constitutional provision 
concerning the rights of an individual is fatal as it depends on the nature of 
the constitutional guarantee and the nature of the breach. In Allie Mohammed 
v The State [1999 2 WLR 552], which is a case that was decided subsequent to 
Coowar (supra) [Coowar v The State [1997 MR 123]], the Privy Council held 
that a voluntary confession obtained in breach of a suspect’s rights under the 
Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago was not automatically inadmissible and 
the trial judge had a discretion to admit it.’94 
There are two points to note about this decision. Firstly, in this case 
the Supreme Court neither refers to nor overrules its 1998 decision in 
State v Coowar Mamode Aniff.95 The 1997 decision it refers to does not 
expressly deal with the issue of the test to be used in determining the 
admissibility of evidence obtained through human rights violations. 
The only issue that the court dealt with in its 1997 decision was: 
‘is the Police under a legal obligation under sections 3 and 5(3)(b) 
of the Constitution, coupled with the Judges’ Rules 1965, to inform 
an accused party who is in police custody of his right to Counsel?’96 
Secondly, in the Privy Council decision referred to by the court, the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was not dealing with a case 
from Mauritius but rather one from Trinidad and Tobago. In Societe 
United Docks v Government of Mauritius; and Desmarais Brothers 
Ltd. v Government of Mauritius97 the Supreme Court held that ‘[t]he 
decisions of the Privy Council are binding upon us when they apply 
Mauritian law.’98 In cases where the Privy Council is constraining the 
law of another country other than Mauritius, ‘their decision would 
be binding only if it were first shown that, on the point in issue, [the 
foreign] law and Mauritian law are identical.’99 In M G C Pointu v The 
Minister of Education and Science100 the Supreme Court quoted with 
approval a conference paper to the effect, inter alia, that judgements of 
the Privy Council are of ‘strong persuasive authority in cases involving 
the interpretation of constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights.’101 
94 Ibid 7.
95 Coowar Mamode Aniff supra (n61).
96 Coowar Mamode Aniff (supra (61) 1.
97 Societe United Docks v Government of Mauritius and Desmarais Brothers Ltd. v 
Government of Mauritius (1981) MR 500.
98 Ibid 15.
99 Ibid 15.
100 M G C Pointu v The Minister of Education and Science (1995) SCJ 350, (1995) MR 
132.
101 Ibid 17.
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In State v Rome A N,102 the Supreme Court, without referring to any 
of its previous decisions on the issue of whether evidence obtained 
through human rights violations is admissible, held that ‘[a] voluntary 
confession obtained in breach of the Rules or a suspect’s constitutional 
rights are not per se inadmissible.’103 The court added that a confession 
obtained through human rights violations will only be excluded if a 
court is of the view that justice requires its exclusion.104 The above 
discussion shows that there is still room for the argument that the 
position in Mauritius on the admissibility of evidence obtained through 
human rights violations is far from being clear. 
Although there are conflicting Supreme Court decisions on this 
issue, lower courts seem to have adopted an approach which allows 
them to exercise discretion in determining whether or not to admit 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. For example, in 
Police v Ramsamy Devadrassen,105 the district court, without referring 
to any Supreme Court or foreign decision, held that:
‘Although the accused has a constitutional right to be assisted by counsel, a 
breach of such a right in itself does not automatically lead to the exclusion 
of any statement recorded. The seriousness and the effect of such a breach 
or other police malpractice have to be assessed. Hence, such breach needs 
to be material and substantial. As stated earlier, it has not been proved to the 
required standard that there has been a breach of the accused’s constitutional 
right to counsel. There is merely some doubt as to whether he wished to be 
assisted or not’.106
Likewise, in Police v Lam Yee Man Lam Chai Kee107 the same court 
and the same magistrate as in Police v Ramsamy Devadrassen,108 came 
to the same conclusion. In Police v Chandraduth Sharma Benidin,109 
the district court referred to the Privy Council decision of Mohammed 
(Allie) v The State110 and to the Judges’ Rules and held that:
‘Thus a voluntary statement obtained in breach of a fundamental right which 
may also be constitutional (e.g right to counsel) is not per se inadmissible; 
there is no automatic exclusion of such a statement in evidence. Admissibility 
will depend upon the seriousness, extent and effect of the breach.’111
102 State v Rome A N (2011) SCJ 319.
103 Ibid 17.
104 Ibid 17.
105 Police v Ramsamy Devadrassen supra (n81).
106 Ibid 10.
107 Police v Lam Yee Man Lam Chai Kee (2008) LPW 396.
108 Police v Ramsamy Devadrassen supra (n81).
109 Police v Chandraduth Sharma Benidin (2009) RDR 212.
110 Mohammed (Allie) v The State (Trinidad and Tobago)[1998] UKPC 49, [1999] 2 AC 
111.
111 Chandraduth Sharma Benidin supra (n109) 5.
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Thus, in exercising their discretion, lower courts may exclude 
evidence obtained through human rights violations. However, 
sometimes the accused will be acquitted when his right was violated by 
the police although no evidence was obtained from him. For example, 
in Police v Bhugwat Bhoomessur112 the district court held that failure 
by the police to inform the accused of the charge against him violated 
his right under art 10(2)(b) of the Constitution and therefore could not 
convict him of the offence against him in the light of that violation.113 
The accused must be informed of the charge unequivocally otherwise 
there will be a violation of the Judges’ Rules and art 10 of the 
Constitution.114 However, the police do not have a duty to inform the 
accused of the exact charge against him.115
Apart from the rights to freedom from torture, silence and access 
to counsel, the Supreme Court has also indirectly dealt with the issue 
of the admissibility of evidence obtained through violating the right 
to privacy. Article 9 of the constitution of Mauritius provides for the 
right to privacy.116 Although the Supreme Court is yet to deal directly 
with the issue of whether or not evidence obtained through a violation 
of the right to privacy is admissible, there is room for the argument 
that the admissibility or otherwise of such evidence will depend on 
the conduct of the police. In State v Pandiyan117 the Supreme Court 
held that ‘evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search may well 
be excluded by a trial Court’ and that ‘the discretion to exclude should 
only be exercised where the police had acted in a reprehensible 
manner.’118 This holding also raises the possibility of the Supreme 
Court developing jurisprudence indicating the difference(s) between 
illegally obtained evidence and unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
One important issue that the Supreme Court has not paid serious 
attention to is the admissibility of evidence obtained through violating 
the accused’s right in a foreign country. In State v Coowar Mamode 
112 Police v Bhugwat Bhoomessur (2009) PMP 166.
113 See also Police v Sooknauth Premowtee – Ruling (2017) INT 62; Police v Sheik 
Mohammad Nasser Jaulim (2015) INT 292.
114 Police v Boodhun Vedanand (2009) RDR 14.
115 See for example, Police v Mosaheb Barath (2017) INT 266; Police v M. A. Peerboccus 
(2017) INT 232; Police v Bholah Rajkumar (2017) INT 253; Police v D. Callichurn 
(2017) INT 199; Police v Marthe Louise Jimmy (2018) INT 1; ICAC v Ramdany 
Rajaramsing (2017) INT 217, p.5; Police v Prevost Louis Fulbert Henric (2018) INT 
45.
116 For a detailed discussion of the right to privacy in Mauritius, see R Mahadew ‘Does 
the Mauritian Constitution protect the right to privacy? An insight from Madhewoo 
v The State of Mauritius’ (2018) 18 Afr Hum Rights L J 189-204.
117 Pandiyan supra (n56).
118 Ibid 10.
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Aniff,119 the accused, who was concealing drugs in his stomach, was 
arrested at the Air Mauritius counter at an airport in Mumbai, India, 
when he was about to board an aircraft to Mauritius. After his arrest 
in India, he made statements to a police officer although he, the 
police officer, had not informed him of his right to counsel. He was 
prosecuted in Mauritius for attempting to import the drugs to that 
country and the statements he made to a police officer in India were 
adduced in evidence. The court observed that:
‘[I]t is not disputed that the accused was not told of his right to counsel for 
there is evidence that it was not the practice in India that an accused party is 
informed of his right to counsel. It is only when an accused party requests to 
be assisted by counsel that the accused is brought to a Magistrate who would 
do the needful. In the absence of such request, it appears that there was no 
obligation on the part of the enquiring officer to tell a suspect that he has the 
right to be assisted by counsel.’120
As illustrated earlier, the court held that the statements in question 
were inadmissible because, unlike the position in Canada, Mauritian 
courts did not have discretion to admit evidence obtained through 
a violation of a constitutional right. It is argued that in this case 
the Supreme court left two difficult questions unanswered – this is 
because they were not amongst the issues that the court was required 
to resolve. First, whether the Constitution of Mauritius is of extra-
territorial application – that is, are Mauritians who are arrested abroad 
expected to enjoy the rights which are provided for in the Mauritian 
Constitution even if those rights are not protected in a foreign country? 
These rights include the right to remain silent and the right to counsel 
which are not expressly provided for in the Constitution but found in 
case law. Secondly, are foreign police officers expected to know which 
rights a Mauritian national is entitled to at the point of arrest so that 
those rights are protected at the time of arrest for the evidence obtained 
from such Mauritian nationals to be admissible? It is argued that in 
the light of the fact that Mauritius signed an agreement with India on 
Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters,121 which agreement is 
silent on the procedure to be followed by Indian officials in obtaining 
evidence from Mauritian nationals arrested in India, there may be a 
need for that agreement to be amended to address the issue of how 
Indian police officers should approach the obtaining of evidence from 
Mauritian nationals who are arrested in India for the purpose of being 
prosecuted in Mauritius. This would ensure that correct procedures 
119 Coowar Mamode Aniff supra (n61).
120 Ibid 2.
121 ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government 
of the Republic of Mauritius on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’ 
(24 October 2005). Available at http://www.cbi.gov.in/interpol/mlat/Maritius.pdf 
The admissibility of evidence obtained through  
human rights violations in Mauritius 277
are adopted to minimise the danger of having that evidence rejected 
by Mauritian courts. 
Another important issue is whether the police have a duty to inform 
a person, who has not yet been arrested, of his constitutional rights. It 
has to be remembered that art 5(2) of the Constitution is only applicable 
to arrested and detained persons and case law shows that the rights to 
silence, against self-incrimination and to counsel are only applicable 
to arrested and detained persons. In State v Ruhumatally M.J.122 the 
police delayed the arrest of the accused until after he had made a 
statement. He argued that the statement in question was inadmissible 
because he had not been informed of his right to remain silent and the 
right to counsel. The prosecution argued that the accused had no such 
rights because he had neither been arrested nor detained at the time 
he made the statement. The Supreme Court held that:
‘The issue of the police delaying the arrest of an accused has serious 
implications. As has been stated earlier, the moment a suspect is arrested 
he has to be informed of the reason of his arrest and this is a constitutional 
right. One way of by-passing that constitutional right is for the police to 
allow a suspect to speak without knowing what he is suspected of and thus 
wait until they have a more or less air-tight case against the suspect before 
arresting him. He is then informed of the offence that he is suspected of 
having committed; but, by that time, it is much too late and the constitutional 
protection afforded to the suspect has, for all intents and purposes, been 
rendered nugatory. I do not wish to embark on an exercise to determine 
whether the police acted deliberately in this manner in the present case. 
However, it is amply clear from the written records that the accused was, 
through the approach taken by the police concerning the timing of his arrest, 
denied the opportunity of getting to know what was reproached of him in 
a timely manner’.123
In holding that the statement was inadmissible, the court held that 
‘the present case goes beyond the mere non-respect of certain 
technicalities in the Judges’ Rules. The manner in which the police 
dealt with the accused as a whole is indicative of and reveals an overall 
unfairness which taints the procedure pursuant to which the statement 
was obtained from him.’124 The above decision shows that the court 
does not hold that a person who is yet to be arrested or detained is 
protected by art 5(2) of the Constitution. The court also does not hold 
that a person who is yet to be arrested has a right to remain silent and a 
right to consult with counsel. Such a person is protected by the Judges’ 
Rules. In Police v Poonappa Naiken Veenesham125 the district court 
122 State v Ruhumatally M.J. (2015) SCJ 384.
123 Ibid 9.
124 Ibid 10.
125 Police v Poonappa Naiken Veenesham (2007) LPW 124.
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held that case law from the Supreme Court ‘establishes that the police 
is under a legal obligation to inform a person in police custody of his 
right to communicate with Counsel…However, in the present case the 
accused was neither detained nor in police custody, so that the above 
obligation does not apply here.’126 However, there are cases where law 
enforcement officers have informed people who have not yet been 
arrested of their ‘constitutional rights’ such as the right to retain a 
lawyer before they question them for their alleged involvement in the 
commission of offences.127 Sometimes a person is not sure whether or 
not he has been arrested by the police.128 Where there is doubt on the 
issue of whether or not the accused had been arrested at the time he 
made a statement, the court will look at the prevailing circumstances 
at the time in question.129 The issue of whether or not a person who 
is yet to be arrested is protected by a constitutional provision which is 
applicable to arrested persons has resulted in conflicting decisions from 
South African courts. Section 35(1) of the South African constitution 
provides for the rights of arrested persons.130 In S v Orrie131 the court 
held that s 35(1) is applicable to suspects. However, in Khan v S,132 
the court held that s 35(1) is not applicable to suspects because ‘[t]he 
rights of “suspects” are adequately catered for by the application of the 
well-established provisions of the Judges’ Rules’.133 In S v Lachman134 
and in Zwane and Another v S135 the Supreme Court of Appeal left 
the question open. It would appear that the Mauritian Supreme Court 
has settled this issue once and for all. People who have not yet been 
arrested are protected by the Judges’ Rules and not by art 5(2) of 
126 Ibid 6.
127 See for example, ICAC v B. Jory (2016) INT 170.
128 Police v Raphael supra (n81).
129 Nobin v The Queen (1952) MR 295.
130 It is to the effect that ‘1. Everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an 
offence has the right a. to remain silent; b. to be informed promptly  i. of the right 
to remain silent; and ii. of the consequences of not remaining silent; c. not to be 
compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence 
against that person; d. to be brought before a court as soon as reasonably possible, 
but not later than  i. 48 hours after the arrest; or ii. the end of the first court day after 
the expiry of the 48 hours, if the 48 hours expire outside ordinary court hours or 
on a day which is not an ordinary court day; e. at the first court appearance after 
being arrested, to be charged or to be informed of the reason for the detention to 
continue, or to be released; and f. to be released from detention if the interests of 
justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions.’
131 S v Orrie (SS 32/2003) [2004] ZAWCHC 25 (14 October 2004); 2004 (3) SA 584 (C). 
See also Makwakwa v S (A409/13) [2014] ZAGPJHC 185 (24 March 2014); 2014 JDR 
1679 (G).
132 Khan v S 2010 (2) SACR 476 (KZP).
133 Ibid para [22].
134 In S v Lachman 2010 (2) SACR 52 (SCA) at para [39].
135 Zwane v S (426/13) [2013] ZASCA 165 (27 November 2013) at para [8].
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the Constitution and they do not have the rights to remain silent and 
consult with counsel. The admissibility of any evidence obtained from 
them will be determined by resorting to the Judges’ Rules. 
The Supreme Court is yet to deal with the issue of whether evidence 
by private individuals in violation of a person’s rights is admissible. 
It should be recalled that in Mauritian law private individuals are 
allowed to arrest suspects and in State v Pandiyan136 the Supreme 
Court held that a private person who arrests on suspicion has a duty 
to inform the arrestee of the reason for his arrest. In Police v Sooklall 
M T 137 one of the accused made a confession to the police but he 
later retracted it on the ground that prior to making it, he had been 
assaulted by the complainant (the victim of the accused’s crime) and 
that the complainant ‘threatened to lock him up if he did not confess 
along the lines which the …[complainant] had told him.’138 In holding 
that the accused had made his statement voluntarily and therefore the 
statement was admissible, the intermediate court observed that:
‘The complaint of threat or inducement in the present case is not directed 
towards the persons in authority who recorded and witnessed the statement 
of accused…but instead towards a witness who is on the prosecution list 
and towards another person who, admittedly, does not form part of the 
investigating team. It is not the contention of the defence that the police 
officers who recorded and witnessed the first statement of the accused knew 
anything about the fact that he had been beaten a few days earlier by the 
… [complainant] who had allegedly threatened him to make confess to the 
charge in his statement’.139
It is argued that when a person alleges that his right, for example 
the right to freedom from torture, was violated before he made a 
statement, whether or not the perpetrator was a private individual 
or a person in authority, such as a police officer, should not be the 
decisive factor. The decisive factor is whether evidence was obtained 
through violating the suspect’s right. It would appear that the court 
was prepared to exclude the evidence if there was evidence that the 
police officers were aware that the accused’s confession had been 
influenced by complainant’s assaults. The court’s approach creates 
room for the argument that evidence obtained by private individuals 
through violating the rights of the accused may be excluded. This 
approach, which could strengthen the protection of the accused’s right 
136 Pandiyan supra (n56). 
137 Police v Sooklall M T (2008) INT 266.
138 Ibid 2.
139 Ibid.
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to a fair trial, has also been followed in some countries such as South 
Africa.140
4 Conclusion
In this article the author has examined the issue of how courts in 
Mauritius have dealt with evidence obtained through human rights 
violations although the Constitution is silent on the manner in which 
courts should deal with that evidence. The fact that the Constitution is 
silent on this issue means that courts have limited their jurisprudence 
to a few rights: the right to freedom from torture; the right to remain 
silent; the right against self-incrimination; and the right to counsel. 
The jurisprudence from Mauritian courts on the issue of whether or 
not evidence obtained through human rights violations should be 
automatically excluded is not consistent. In some cases courts have 
held that such evidence is automatically inadmissible whereas in 
others courts have held that such evidence may be admissible. It is 
recommended that the best approach would be to only exclude such 
evidence if its admission would render the trial unfair or would be 
detrimental to the administration of justice. In the light of the fact 
that the Supreme Court is of the view that this test is not applicable 
in Mauritius because it is not provided for in the Constitution, 
it is recommended that the Constitution may have to be amended 
to expressly address this issue. Otherwise, the Supreme Court 
may have to revisit its jurisprudence on this issue. Courts in some 
jurisdictions, such as Hong Kong and Namibia, have held that there 
are circumstances in which evidence obtained through human rights 
violations is admissible notwithstanding the fact that the constitutions 
of these countries are silent on the issue of how courts should deal 
with such evidence.
140 See S v Mini (B325/2013) [2015] ZAWCHC 49 (30 April 2015) (private security officers 
assaulted the accused and the court held that the evidence obtained as a result of 
the assault was inadmissible); S v Hena (CC1/06 , ECJ25/06) [2006] ZAECHC 11 
(8 March 2006) (members of the ant-crime committee assaulted the accused and the 
court held that the evidence discovered as a result of the assault was inadmissible).
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